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Abstract—Optimal power allocation for orthogonal frequency
division multiplexing (OFDM) wiretap channels with Gaussian
channel inputs has already been studied in some previous works
from an information theoretical viewpoint. However, these results
are not sufficient for practical system designs. One reason is
that discrete channel inputs, such as quadrature amplitude
modulation (QAM) signals, instead of Gaussian channel inputs,
are deployed in current practical wireless systems to maintain
moderate peak transmission power and receiver complexity. In
this paper, we investigate the power allocation and artificial
noise design for OFDM wiretap channels with discrete channel
inputs. We first prove that the secrecy rate function for discrete
channel inputs is nonconcave with respect to the transmission
power. To resolve the corresponding nonconvex secrecy rate
maximization problem, we develop a low-complexity power
allocation algorithm, which yields a duality gap diminishing in
the order of O(1/
√
N), where N is the number of subcarriers
of OFDM. We then show that independent frequency-domain
artificial noise cannot improve the secrecy rate of single-antenna
wiretap channels. Towards this end, we propose a novel time-
domain artificial noise design which exploits temporal degrees of
freedom provided by the cyclic prefix of OFDM systems to jam
the eavesdropper and boost the secrecy rate even with a single
antenna at the transmitter. Numerical results are provided to
illustrate the performance of the proposed design schemes.
Index Terms—Artificial noise, wiretap OFDM, power alloca-
tion, discrete channel inputs, secrecy rate.
I. INTRODUCTION
Security has become increasingly important for wireless
networks due to the proliferation of privacy-sensitive wire-
less services. Traditionally, wireless information security is
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handled by cryptographic protocols in media access control
(MAC) and higher layers [1]. However, these techniques face
severe challenges due to the rapid developments of encryption
breaking algorithms and super-computers [2]. Recently, vari-
ous physical-layer techniques have been proposed to realize
perfect secrecy in wireless networks [3], [4].
The fundamentals of physical-layer security techniques
were laid in [5]–[7]. These works studied the maximum data
rate for secrecy communications, i.e., the secrecy capacity, for
a wiretap channel in which an eavesdropper (Eve) intends to
wiretap the secrecy communications from a transmitter (Alice)
to a legitimate receiver (Bob). Recently, various techniques,
such as power allocation, beamforming and training schemes,
have been developed to maximize the secrecy capacity of
wiretap channels, e.g., [8]–[20]. One effective technique is
initiatively transmitting artificial noise to jam the eavesdropper
if the transmitter is equipped with multiple antennas, e.g.,
[15]–[19]. Besides, advanced techniques based on secrecy-
key agreement were also studied in [21]–[25] to improve the
security of wireless networks.
A common assumption of these studies is that the trans-
mitted signal has a Gaussian distribution. However, Gaussian
signals are hardly used in practice due to its infinite peak
power and its excessive detection complexities. Instead, dis-
crete inputs such as Phase Shift Keying (PSK) and Quadrature
Amplitude Modulation (QAM) (see Fig. 1(a)) are prevalent
in practical digital communication systems [26]. Furthermore,
most existing artificial noise designs rely heavily on the spatial
degrees of freedom provided by multiple transmit antennas,
which are not available in single-antenna wiretap channels.
In this paper, we consider an OFDM wiretap channel with
discrete channel inputs, where each node is equipped with a
single antenna and Alice has perfect knowledge of the channel
state information (CSI) for the wireless links to Bob and Eve.
We intend to answer the following questions: What are the
differences between the secrecy rate functions corresponding
to Gaussian and discrete channel inputs? Do these differences
introduce additional difficulty in solving the power allocation
problem of the OFDM wiretap channel with discrete channel
inputs? Can we make use of artificial noise to improve the
secrecy rate of an OFDM wiretap channel when the transmitter
is equipped with only one antenna? To address these questions,
we first study the convexity of the secrecy rate function with
discrete channel inputs, and then develop power allocation and
time-domain artificial noise designs to maximize the secrecy
rate of OFDM wiretap channels. The main contributions of
this paper are summarized as follows:
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• We prove that the secrecy rate of any discrete channel
inputs with a finite number of possible values (or more
generally with a finite entropy) is a nonconcave function
with respect to the transmit power (Proposition 1). This is
in contrast to the case of Gaussian channel inputs, where
the associated secrecy rate is concave and the optimal
power allocation has a closed-form solution [8]–[10].
• A low-complexity power allocation algorithm based on
Lagrange dual optimization is then proposed for discrete
channel inputs. We show that the duality gap of the pro-
posed algorithm diminishes asymptotically in the order
of O(1/
√
N) as N increases, where N is the number of
subcarriers of OFDM (Proposition 2).
• We show that simply inserting independent artificial noise
in the frequency domain cannot improve the secrecy rate
of single-antenna wiretap channels (Proposition 3). To
resolve this problem, we propose a time-domain artificial
noise design for the considered single-antenna OFDM
wiretap channel which exploits temporal degrees of free-
dom provided by the cyclic prefix of OFDM systems to
jam the eavesdropper. To the best of our knowledge, this
is the first time-domain artificial noise design for OFDM
wiretap channels.
• Finally, we jointly optimize the subcarrier power allo-
cation and the covariance matrix of the time-domain
artificial noise to improve the secrecy rate. Successive
convex approximation methods are proposed to handle
the joint design problem efficiently. Numerical results
are presented to show that the proposed artificial noise
schemes can considerably boost the secrecy rate.
There are several related works published recently. For
example, linear precoding was studied for multiple-input
multiple-output (MIMO) wiretap channels with discrete inputs
[27], [28], where the solution is locally optimal. In [29], the
OFDM wiretap channel was treated as a special instance of
the MIMO wiretap channel and its achievable secrecy rates
were studied under both Gaussian inputs and rectangular QAM
constellations through asymptotic high/low SNR analysis and
numerical evaluations. In contrast, we consider a broader dis-
crete channel input setting along with more general analytical
results in Propositions 1-3. Artificial noise design was studied
in [30] for single antenna wiretap channel with discrete inputs
(without OFDM), by assuming an AWGN channel to the Bob
and a fast fading channel to the Eve. Our work considers quasi-
static fading channels to both Bob and Eve, and respectively
studies frequency domain and time domain artificial noise
designs.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we present the system model and the power
allocation problem, and then prove the nonconcavity of the
secrecy rate under discrete channel inputs. In Section III, a
power allocation algorithm without using artificial noise is
presented for handling the secrecy rate maximization problem.
Section IV presents the time-domain artificial noise design
and two artificial noise aided power allocation algorithms (one
for discrete inputs and the other for Gaussian inputs). Finally,
some conclusions are drawn in Section V.
Notation: C,Cn and Cm×n denote the set of complex
numbers, n-vectors, m×n matrices, respectively. Bold upper-
case letters denote matrices and bold lowercase letters denote
column vectors. IN denotes an N×N identity matrix. A  0
denotes that the matrix A is a positive semi-definite matrix.
tr(A) denotes the trace of matrix A. p  0 means that each
component of vector p is nonnegative. x ∼ CN (0,Σ) denotes
that x is a complex Gaussian random vector with zero mean
and covariance matrix Σ. E[x] represents the expectation of
the random variable x, and E[x|y] denotes the conditional
expectation of x given y. Function H(x) denotes the entropy
of random variable x, and I(x; y) denotes the mutual informa-
tion between random variables x and y. Diag(x1, x2, ..., xN )
denotes the N ×N diagonal matrix whose diagonal elements
are x1, x2, ..., xN . [x]
+ , max{x, 0}, and f ′(x0) denotes the
first derivative of f(x) at the point x0.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND POWER ALLOCATION PROBLEM
Consider a single-antenna OFDM wiretap channel with N
subcarriers. Let Hi ∈ C and Gi ∈ C represent the complex
channel coefficients of the ith subcarrier from the transmitter
to the legitimate receiver and to the eavesdropper, respectively
(see Fig. 1(b)). The received signals of the legitimate receiver
and the eavesdropper can be expressed as
yi = Hi
√
pisi + wi, i = 1, . . . , N, (1a)
zi = Gi
√
pisi + vi, i = 1, . . . , N, (1b)
respectively, where si ∈ C is the normalized channel input
signal with zero mean and unity variance; pi ≥ 0 denotes
the power of the ith subcarrier; wi ∈ C and vi ∈ C are
independent zero-mean circularly symmetric complex Gaus-
sian noises with unity variance at the legitimate receiver and
the eavesdropper, respectively. The channel coefficient Hi is
known to the transmitter and the legitimate receiver, and Gi
is known to the transmitter and the eavesdropper, which are
satisfied if all the three nodes are within the same wireless
system. The channel inputs {si} are statistically independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) Gaussian signals or some
practical discrete signals, e.g., QAM (see Fig. 1(a)).
The secrecy rate associated with the signal model in (1) can
be shown to be [8]
Rs(p)=
1
N
N∑
i=1
[I(si;Hi√pisi + wi)−I(si;Gi√pisi + vi)]+,
(2)
where p = [p1, p2, ..., pN ]T contains all the subcarrier power
variables. Let us consider the following secrecy rate maxi-
mization problem:
R⋆ = max
p0
Rs(p) (3a)
s.t.
1
N
N∑
i=1
pi ≤ P, (3b)
where P in (3b) is the allowed maximal transmit power, and
R⋆ denotes the maximum achievable secrecy rate.
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Fig. 1: (a) Finite discrete inputs: QPSK and 16QAM, (b)
OFDM wiretap channel.
A. Gaussian Channel Inputs
We first briefly review the case when {si} are Gaussian
signals. In this case, the secrecy rate Rs(p) in (2) can be
easily reduced to
Rs(p) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
[ log2(1+|Hi|2pi)−log2(1+|Gi|2pi) ]+, (4)
which is known to be concave in p. Therefore, the power
allocation problem (3) is a convex problem which can be
solved efficiently thanks to the following closed-form solution
[8]–[10]:
p⋆i =


1
2|Hi|2|Gi|2
[√
C2i− 4|Hi|
2|Gi|2(λ+|Gi|2−|Hi|2)
λ −Ci
]
,
if |Hi|2−|Gi|2>λ
0, otherwise,
(5)
where Ci = |Hi|2+|Gi|2, andλ ≥ 0 is the Lagrange multiplier
associated with the total power constraint (3b), and should be
chosen such that {p⋆i } in (5) satisfies 1N
∑N
i=1 p
⋆
i = P . The
reader can refer to [8]–[10] for more details.
B. Discrete Channel Inputs
In [28], [30]–[33], it was observed from computer sim-
ulations that the secrecy rate Rs(p) in (4) is nonconcave
in p for some discrete constellations, such as QPSK and
16QAM. One can infer from Theorem 1 in [32] that Rs(p) is
nonconcave for any uniformly distributed discrete inputs. We
now prove that Rs(p) is nonconcave for any discrete channel
input distribution with a finite number of possible values:
Proposition 1 Consider the following secrecy rate function:
R(p) , [I(s;H√ps+ w) − I(s;G√ps+ v)]+, (6)
where s has zero mean and unity variance, and w and v are
circularly symmetric complex Gaussian random variables with
zero mean and unity variance. Suppose that s has a finite
entropy, i.e., H(s) < ∞. Then, if |H | > |G|, R(p) ≥ 0 and
R(p) is nonconcave in p; otherwise, R(p) = 0 for all p ≥ 0.
Proof: We first show that R(0) = limp→∞R(p) = 0.
When p = 0, one can easily show that I(s;w) = I(s; v) =
0, because s is statistically independent of w and v. Thus,
R(0) = 0. Since s has a finite entropy, it must be a discrete
random variable. According to Lemma 6 of [34], we have
lim
p→∞
I(s;H√ps+w) = lim
p→∞
I(s;G√ps+ v) = H(s) <∞.
(7)
Therefore,
lim
p→∞
R(p) = 0. (8)
Next, let us show that, when |H | > |G|, there exists a
pˆ ∈ (0,∞) such that R(pˆ) > 0. According to [34], the gradient
of I(s;H√ps+ w) is given by
∂I(s;H√ps+ w)
∂p
= |H |2mmse (|H |2p) ≥ 0, (9)
where
mmse(|H |2p) , E [|s− E(s|H√ps+ w)|2] (10)
is the minimum mean square error (MMSE) of estimating s
with the received signal y = H√ps + w. When p equals
zero, mmse(|H |2p) in (10) attains its maximum value, i.e.,
mmse(0) = E[|s|2] = 1. Thus, by (6) and (9), it can be seen
that R′(0) = |H |2 − |G|2 > 0, which implies that there must
exist a positive pˆ such that R(pˆ) > 0.
Since R(p) is continuous and differentiable [34], by the
Lagrange’s mean value theorem [35] and the fact that R(pˆ) >
limp→∞R(p) = 0, it can be inferred that there must exist a
point p˜ ∈ [pˆ,∞) satisfying R(p˜) <∞ and R′(p˜) < 0.
Now suppose that R(p) is a concave function on p ∈ [0,∞).
Then the following inequality
R(p) ≤ R(p˜) + R′(p˜)(p− p˜) (11)
must hold for any p ∈ [0,∞). By letting p → ∞ in (11),
we obtain limp→∞R(p) = −∞ since R′(p˜) < 0, which
however contradicts the fact of limp→∞R(p) = 0. Therefore,
the concavity assumption for R(p) is not true.
When |H | ≤ |G|, I(s;H√ps + w) ≤ I(s;G√ps+ v) for
any p ≥ 0. Hence, in this case, R(p) = 0 for all p ≥ 0.
Proposition 1 is thus proved.
Proposition 1 implies that finding an optimal power allo-
cation for maximizing Rs(p) is a non-trivial design problem,
as will be discussed shortly. By Proposition 1, the secrecy
rate function is not a concave function for any channel input
distribution with a finite entropy. Basically two types of inputs
have finite entropy, including discrete distributions with a finite
number of distinct values and some of the discrete distributions
with a countable number of distinct values1. On the other
hand, distributions with an infinite entropy basically include all
1A discrete distribution with a countable number of values may either have
a finite entropy or an infinite entropy [36, page 48].
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Fig. 2: (a) Mutual information and (b) secrecy rate for a Gaus-
sian channel input. (c) Mutual information and (d) secrecy rate
for a QPSK channel input. Here |H | = 1 and |G| = 0.5.
continuous distributions and some of the discrete distributions
with a countable number of values, and this type of channel
inputs may have a concave secrecy rate function.
Let us provide some numerical results to illustrate Proposi-
tion 1. Figure 2 shows the mutual information I(s;H√ps +
w), I(s;G√ps+ v), and the secrecy rate R(p) for Gaussian
and QPSK channel inputs. One can observe from Fig. 2(a)
and Fig. 2(b) that I(s;H√ps + w), I(s;G√ps + v) and
R(p) are all concave when the inputs are Gaussian. From Fig.
2(c), I(s;H√ps+ w) and I(s;G√ps+ v) are also concave
for QPSK channel inputs; however, the associated R(p) is
obviously not concave, as shown in Fig. 2(d).
We further claim that the secrecy rate R(p) is not even an
quasi-concave function for certain channel input distributions,
by showing a counter example that the secrecy rate may have
multiple peaks. Figure 3 further illustrates the secrecy rate
R(p) in the logarithmic scale of p for a non-standard 4-PAM
channel input s 2, where the probability mass function of s is
given by
Ps ∼
[ −51q −50q 50q 51q
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
]
, (12)
where q is a normalization parameter used to maintain the
unity variance of s. It is interesting to see from Fig. 3 that
the secrecy rate R(p) has two peaks. Hence, R(p) is neither
concave nor quasi-concave. When p < −10dB, both Bob
and Eve cannot identify the constellation points. Since the
constellation of s in (12) has two groups (i.e., the group of
{−51q,−50q} and the group {51q, 50q}), Bob and Eve start
2While the mutual information I(s;H√ps+w) and I(s;G√ps+v) are
concave functions in p, they appear to be nonconcave in logarithmic scale.
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Fig. 3: Secrecy rate for a non-standard 4-PAM channel input
with probability mass function given by (12). Here |H | = 1
and |G| = 0.5.
to be able to identify the two groups as p increases. Since
|H | > |G|, I(s;H√ps + w) is larger than I(s;G√ps + v),
and so R(p) > 0. When p ≈ 18dB, both Bob and Eve
can identify the two groups of s, and I(s;H√ps + w) ≈
I(s;G
√
ps + v) ≈ 1 bits/s/Hz, and so R(p) decreases to
nearly 0. When p ≥ 20dB, Bob and Eve start to identify
each constellation point. Since Bob has better channel quality,
R(p) increases with p again. This example also shows that
the conjecture in [32], which claims the secrecy rate under
discrete finite constellations has a single maximum, is not true
for some discrete channel inputs.
III. PROPOSED POWER ALLOCATION ALGORITHM
We now present a computationally efficient Lagrange dual
optimization algorithm to handle the nonconvex problem (3).
We will show that the proposed algorithm yields a power
allocation solution for which the duality gap decreases with
N in the order of O(1/
√
N), provided that the channel has a
finite delay spread. This mild condition is satisfied in practical
OFDM systems.
A. Asymptotic Optimal Power Allocation by Dual Opti-
mization
The Lagrangian of problem (3) is given by
L(p, λ) = 1
N
N∑
i=1
[I(si;Hi√pisi+wi)−I(si;Gi√pisi + vi)]+
+λ
(
P − 1
N
N∑
i=1
pi
)
, (13)
where λ ≥ 0 is the dual variable associated with the constraint
(3b). The dual problem is given by
D⋆ = min
λ≥0
d(λ), (14)
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TABLE I
Algorithm 1: Proposed power allocation scheme for discrete inputs.
Given: λh ≥ λl = 0, convergence tolerance ε
repeat:
step 1: update λ = 1
2
(λl + λh)
step 2: obtain {pi}Ni=1 by solving problem (17)
step 3: if 1
N
N∑
i=1
pi < P , then update λh = λ, else update λl = λ
until: λh − λl < ε
output: output λ⋆ = λl.
where D⋆ denotes the optimal dual objective value, and d(λ)
is the dual function given by
d(λ) , max
p0
L(p, λ). (15)
The Lagrange dual method first solves problem (15) for a
given dual variable λ. According to (13), problem (15) can be
decomposed into N separate subproblems, i.e.,
d(λ) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
B(pi;λ,Hi, Gi) + λP, (16)
where
B(pi;λ,Hi, Gi)
=max
pi≥0
[I(si;Hi√pisi+wi)−I(si;Gi√pisi+vi)]+−λpi (17)
is a one-dimensional power allocation subproblem for subcar-
rier i, which can be efficiently solved by simple line search
[37].
Notice that d(λ) is a convex function [37] and its subgra-
dient can be easily seen, from (16) and (17), to be
▽d(λ) = P − 1
N
N∑
i=1
p⋆i ,
where p⋆i is the optimal solution to (17). Therefore, the dual
variable λ can be efficiently updated using the bisection
method [37]. If P − 1N
∑N
i=1 p
⋆
i > 0, then the subgradient
▽d(λ) > 0, and thus we decrease λ in the bisection method
for finding D⋆ given by (14); otherwise we increase λ. The
resulting power allocation algorithm, called Algorithm 1, for
finding the desired p⋆ for problem (3) is summarized in Table
I. It is important to note from (8) that the secrecy rate is not
an increasing function of the transmit power. Therefore, when
the total power P is large enough, the optimal total transmit
power 1N
∑N
i=1 p
⋆
i by solving (17) can be strictly lower than
the available transmit power P , and the optimal dual variable is
λ⋆ = 0 by the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions [37]. It
is worthwhile to mention that Algorithm 1 can also be applied
to the case of Gaussian inputs, where the per-subcarrier power
allocation subproblem (17) has a closed-form solution exactly
the same as (5) [8]–[10].
Since the primal problem (3) is nonconvex, there is a
duality gap between the optimal R⋆ and optimal D⋆, i.e.,
D⋆ − R⋆ > 0, where R⋆ and D⋆ are defined in (3) and
(14), respectively. Under a Lipschitz continuity assumption
on the channel coefficients [38], it can be shown that the
duality gap between D⋆ and R⋆ diminishes with N in the
order of O(1/
√
N). Prior to presenting such result, some
quantities used in the discrete frequency domain and the
corresponding quantities in the continuous frequency domain
need to be reviewed. Let H(f) and G(f) denote the frequency
domain channel responses of the legitimate receiver and the
eavesdropper, respectively. Owing to uniform sampling in Dis-
crete Fourier transform (DFT) over the normalized frequency
interval 0 ≤ f ≤ 1, we have
H(i/N) = Hi, G(i/N) = Gi, 1 ≤ i ≤ N. (18)
In general, the time-domain channel has a finite delay spread
(i.e., it is nonzero only on a finite time interval), leading to
the fact that any order derivatives of its frequency response
exist and are bounded [39, pp. 94-96]. In particular, the first
derivatives of H(f) and G(f) exist and are bounded. There-
fore, there exist some LH , LG > 0 such that the following
Lipschitz continuous conditions hold for all f, f ′ ∈ [0, 1]:∣∣H(f)−H(f ′)∣∣≤LH|f−f ′|, ∣∣G(f)−G(f ′)∣∣≤LG|f − f ′| (19)
We can show the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Suppose that the channel coefficients H(f)
and G(f) are Lipschitz continuous satisfying (19). Then
0 ≤ D⋆ −R⋆ ≤ O
(
1√
N
)
, (20)
where R⋆ and D⋆ are defined in problem (3) and problem
(14), respectively.
Proof: In accordance with [38, Theorem 2], for proving
(20) it is sufficient to show that there exists a constant LR > 0
such that the difference between the secrecy rates on any two
frequencies, Rs(f, p) and Rs(f ′, p′), is bounded, i.e.,
|Rs(f, p)−Rs(f ′, p′)| ≤ LR (|f − f ′|+ |p− p′|) , (21)
for any f, f ′ ∈ [0, 1] and p, p′ ≥ 0, namely, that the secrecy
rate Rs(f, p) is Lipschitz continuous. The proof of (21) is
presented in Appendix I.
B. Numerical Results
We now provide some numerical results to illustrate the
efficacy of the proposed power allocation scheme (Algorithm
1 in Table I). Suppose that the OFDM system has N = 64
subcarriers. The length of the cyclic prefix (CP) is Ncp = 16
channel samples. Each channel realization is composed of 8
i.i.d. Rayleigh fading paths with the maximum time delay of
7 samples and the channel power normalized to unity. The
numerical results are obtained by averaging over 300 channel
realizations for each signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) value, where
SNR = P (which is the ratio of the available transmit power
to AWGN power (E[|wi|2] = E[|vi|2] = 1) per subcarrier).
The proposed power allocation algorithm is compared with
two existing algorithms. The first one is the equal power
allocation scheme, denoted by “equal PA”, which allocates
the total power uniformly over all the subcarriers that satisfy
|Hi| > |Gi|; the second one is the power allocation scheme
for Gaussian channel inputs, which is given by (5), denoted
by “PA of (5)”.
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Fig. 4: Secrecy rates achieved by Algorithm 1 (in Table I)
denoted by “+", equal power allocation scheme denoted by
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Fig. 5: Power allocation results obtained using Algorithm 1
for the case of Gaussian inputs and the case of QPSK inputs,
where SNR = 0dB; 5dB; 10dB and N = 64.
Figure 4 illustrates the achievable secrecy rates of the three
power allocation schemes for different channel inputs. It can
be observed from this figure that Algorithm 1 (denoted by
“+”) achieves the highest secrecy rate (although it yields the
same optimal solution (5) for Gaussian channel inputs). One
can observe, from Fig. 4, that under discrete inputs (QPSK
and 16QAM), both the equal PA scheme (denoted by “◦”)
and the PA scheme of (5) (denoted by “⊲”) do not perform
well—their secrecy rates even drop to zero in the high SNR
regime. The secrecy rate utilized by Algorithm 1 increases
with SNR, but saturates (rather than drops to zero) in the high
SNR regime, implying that there exists a power threshold for
which the secrecy rate reaches the maximum, and the power
exceeding the threshold will not improve the secrecy rate any
more. The reason for this is that the secrecy rate is not an
increasing function of the transmit power due to (8). Similar
observations were also reported in [28], [31].
Figure 5 illustrates the power allocation results obtained by
Algorithm 1 for Gaussian and QPSK channel inputs. Three
SNR values are considered, i.e., SNR = 0dB, 5dB, 10dB. It
can be observed, from Fig. 5, that the transmit power is only
allocated to the subcarriers on which Bob has larger channel
gain than Eve. As previously mentioned, for discrete channel
inputs, it may not be true that the total power constraint
(3b) is active for the power allocation result obtained by
Algorithm 1. Actually, when P is larger than a threshold, the
power allocation result remains unchanged. As shown in Fig.
5, when the channel inputs are QPSK, the power allocation
result associated with SNR = 5dB almost coincides with
that associated with SNR = 10dB. This also demonstrates
that the total transmit power constraint (3b) is inactive when
SNR = 10dB for QPSK inputs.
IV. JOINT SIGNAL AND ARTIFICIAL NOISE DESIGN
As presented in the previous section, the secrecy rate
obtained by Algorithm 1 reaches the maximum value and satu-
rates in the high SNR regime. In other words, the transmitter in
the high SNR regime will not consume all the available trans-
mit power. This motivates the use of the remaining transmit
power for generating artificial noise to jam the eavesdropper,
thus further increasing the secrecy rate. In the subsequent
subsections, the independent frequency-domain artificial noise
design is shown to be ineffective first. Then a novel time-
domain artificial noise scheme is proposed to exploit temporal
degrees of freedom provided by the cyclic prefix of OFDM
systems to jam the eavesdropper and boost the secrecy rate.
A. Ineffectiveness of Independent Frequency-Domain Artificial
Noise Design
Let us first consider a naive strategy by adding artificial
noise to all the subcarriers in the frequency domain, as
illustrated in Fig. 6(a), where P = Diag(p1, p2, ..., pN ) and
s = [s1, s2, ..., sN ]
T
. The corresponding received signals
of the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper on the ith
subcarrier can be expressed as
yi = Hi(
√
pisi + aˆi) + wi, i = 1, . . . , N, (22a)
zi = Gi(
√
pisi + aˆi) + vi, i = 1, . . . , N, (22b)
where aˆi ∈ C is the artificial noise term added to the ith
subcarrier. It is assumed that aˆi are statistically independent
across the subcarriers and aˆi ∼ CN (0, σ2a,i), where σ2a,i ≥ 0
is the artificial noise power for subcarrier i. According to [8],
the secrecy rate for the signal model (22) is given by
RANs =
1
N
N∑
i=1
[I(si;Hi(√pisi + aˆi) + wi)
−I(si;Gi(√pisi + aˆi) + vi)]+. (23)
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Fig. 6: (a) System model of OFDM transceiver with artificial noise (AN) added in the frequency domain. (b) System model
of OFDM transceiver with artificial noise added in the time domain.
In order to maximize RANs in (23), power parameters {pi} and
{σ2a,i} should be jointly optimized, which can be formulated
as the following optimization problem:
max
{pi}Ni=1,{σ2a,i}Ni=1
RANs (24a)
s.t.
1
N
N∑
i=1
(pi + σ
2
a,i) ≤ P (24b)
σ2a,i ≥ 0, pi ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, ..., N. (24c)
The optimal solution for artificial noise power parameters of
(24) is given in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 For any given distribution of {si}, the optimal
artificial noise power σ2a,i to problem (24) is equal to zero for
all i.
For the case that {si} are Gaussian, Proposition 3 can be
simply proved by showing that, when |Hi|2 > |Gi|2, the
secrecy rate RANs is strictly decreasing in σ2a,i for any pi ≥ 0.
The proof for the case of arbitrarily distributed {si} is more
complicated, because RANs may be non-monotonic in σ2a,i.
The proof details for general distributions of {si} are presented
in Appendix II.
Proposition 3 implies that adding artificial noise in the
frequency domain is not effective since it only degrades the
achievable secrecy rate. Next let us turn to the design of
artificial noise in the time domain which is able to boost the
secrecy rate.
B. Proposed Time-domain Artificial Noise Design
The proposed wiretap OFDM system with a time-domain
artificial noise is illustrated in Fig. 6(b). As a standard OFDM
system, at first the frequency domain signal P1/2s is trans-
formed to the time domain by inverse fast Fourier transform
(IFFT) and then the cyclic prefix (CP) is inserted. Then,
an artificial noise term is added to this time-domain signal
before transmission. The receiver will discard the CP and then
transform the remaining signal to the frequency domain by
FFT. All of these operations can be expressed by linear matrix
operations [40].
Let F and FH denote the N ×N FFT and IFFT matrices,
and let Ncp denote the length of CP. The matrices for CP in-
sertion and removal are represented by Tcp = [E˜TNcp×N IN ]
T
and Rcp = [0N×Ncp IN ], respectively, where E˜Ncp×N con-
tains the last Ncp rows of the N ×N identity matrix IN . Let
[h(0), h(1), ..., h(L)] and [g(0), g(1), ..., g(L)] represent the
time-domain channel impulse responses from the transmitter
to the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper, respectively,
where L < Ncp is the maximum delay spread. Then, following
the system block diagram in Fig. 6(b), the received signals of
the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper can be expressed
as [40]
y = FRcpH0(T
cpFHP1/2s+ a) +w
= HP1/2s + FRcpH0a+w,
(25a)
z = FRcpG0(T
cpFHP1/2s+ a) + v
=GP1/2s+ FRcpG0a+ v,
(25b)
where a ∈ CN+Ncp is a zero-mean complex Gaussian random
vector, H0 ∈ C(N+Ncp)×(N+Ncp) is a Toeplitz channel matrix
given by
H0 =


h(0) 0 0 · · · 0
.
.
. h(0) 0 · · · 0
h(L) · · · . . . · · · ...
.
.
.
.
.
. · · · . . . 0
0 · · · h(L) · · · h(0)

 ,
and so is the matrix G0, i.e., by replacing h(l) with g(l), l =
0, 1, ..., L, in H0. Moreover, in (25), H = FRcpH0TcpFH =
Diag(H1, H2, ..., HN ) and G = FRcpG0TcpFH =
Diag(G1, G2, ..., GN ), in which Hi and Gi are the frequency
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responses of the legitimate receiver’s channel and the eaves-
dropper’s channel, respectively, and w ∼ CN (0, IN ) and
v ∼ CN (0, IN ) are the corresponding noise vectors at the
legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper, respectively.
The received signal vectors given in (25) can be equivalently
written as
yi = Hi
√
pisi + f
T
i R
cpH0a+ wi, i = 1, 2, ..., N, (26a)
zi = Gi
√
pisi + f
T
i R
cpG0a+ vi, i = 1, 2, ..., N, (26b)
respectively, where fTi ∈ CN is the ith row of the FFT matrix
F. Note that this corresponds to a simplified model of secure
design in MIMO secrecy networks with a cooperative jammer
[41].
In order not to interfere with the legitimate receiver, the
artificial noise is fully laid in the null space of the channel of
the legitimate receiver. Specifically, we let
a = Ud, (27)
where U is a semi-unitary matrix whose column vectors span
the null space of RcpH0, i.e.,
RcpH0U = 0, U
HU = INcp , (28)
and d ∼ CN (0,Σd) in which Σd is the covariance matrix of
the artificial noise vector d to be determined. As the dimension
of RcpH0 is N×(N+Ncp), the dimension of U is (N+Ncp)×Ncp
and the dimension of d is Ncp.
Now, by (27) and (28), the received signal in (26) reduces
to
yi = Hi
√
pisi + wi, i = 1, 2, ..., N, (29a)
zi = Gi
√
pisi + f
T
i R
cpG0Ud+ vi, i = 1, 2, ..., N. (29b)
In general, the receiver detects the information in a subcarrier-
by-subcarrier manner, and the secrecy rate achieved by (29) is
given by [8]
1
N
N∑
i=1
[
I(si;Hi√pisi + wi)− I(si; Gi
√
pisi√
b
H
i Σdbi + 1
+ vˆi)
]+
,
(30)
where bHi , fTi RcpG0U, and vˆi ∼ CN (0, 1). The joint
power allocation and artificial noise design problem can be
formulated as
max
{pi}
N
i=1
,Σd
1
N
N∑
i=1
[
I(si;Hi√pisi+wi)−I(si; Gi
√
pisi√
bHi Σdbi+1
+vˆi)
]+
(31a)
s.t.
1
N
(
N∑
i=1
pi + tr(Σd)
)
≤ P (31b)
Σd  0, pi ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , N. (31c)
C. Lagrange Dual Optimization to Problem (31) through
Successive Convex Approximation
Problem (31) is nonconvex and difficult to handle. Again,
as in Section III, we consider Lagrange dual optimization to
solve problem (31). The Lagrange of problem (31) is given
by (32) at the bottom of the page, where λ is the Lagrange
dual variable associated with constraint (31b). The associated
dual function is defined as
d(λ) = max
p0,Σd0
L(p,Σd, λ). (33)
The bisection method used in Section III-A can also be applied
to the following dual problem
min
λ≥0
d(λ). (34)
However, solving problem (33) is still challenging since the
Lagrangian is not concave in (p,Σd). We use the coordinate
descent method [42] to handle problem (33), that tries to
maximize the Lagrangian by updating variable p and Σd in
an alternating fashion, to be presented next.
1) Update of p with fixed Σd: With Σd fixed, the optimal
p to problem (33) can be obtained by solving the one-
dimensional problems (35) given at the bottom of the page.
2) Update of Σd with fixed p: Because the solution p⋆
given by (35) would yield nonnegative {I(si;Hi√pisi+wi)−
I(si; Gi
√
pisi√
bH
i
Σdbi+1
+ vˆi), ∀i}, with p fixed, problem (33) is
equivalent to the following minimization problem:
min
Σd0
N∑
i=1
I(si; Gi√
bHi Σdbi + 1
√
pisi+ vˆi)+λtr(Σd). (36)
For ease of presentation, let us define
Ti(Σd),I(si; Gi√
bHi Σdbi + 1
√
pisi + vˆi), i = 1, 2, ..., N.
(37)
Next, we apply a successive convex approximation method
which guarantees to yield a stationary point of problem (36).
Consider the first-order approximation to Ti(Σd). Let ti =
(bHi Σdbi+1)
−1
. Then Ti(Σd) becomes a function of ti, i.e.,
Ti(ti), and its first derivative with respect to ti is given by
T ′i (ti) = |Gi|2pimmse(|Gi|2piti). (by (9)) (38)
Then it is readily to see that the first-order approximation of
Ti(ti) at the point t¯i = (bHi Σ¯dbi + 1)−1, where Σ¯d is the
one obtained in the previous iteration, is given by
T˜i(ti) = Ti(t¯i) +|Gi|2pi[mmse(|Gi|2pit¯i)] (ti − t¯i) . (39)
L(p,Σd, λ)=
1
N
N∑
i=1
[
I(si;Hi√pisi+wi)−I(si; Gi
√
pisi√
bH
i
Σdbi+1
+vˆi)
]+
+ λ
(
P − 1N
N∑
i=1
pi − 1N tr(Σd)
)
(32)
p⋆i = argmax
pi>0
[I(si;Hi√pisi+ wi)−I(si; Gi
√
pisi√
bHi Σdbi+1
+ vˆi)]
+−λpi, i = 1, 2, ..., N. (35)
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TABLE II
SCA Algorithm: Algorithm for solving problem (36)
Given: Σ¯d
repeat:
step 1: solve problem (43) by CVX and obtain optimal Σd
step 2: set Σ¯d = Σd
until: a specified convergence criterion is satisfied.
So we come up with the following first-order approximation
to problem (36):
min
Σd0,{ti}Ni=1
N∑
i=1
T˜i(ti) + λtr(Σd)
s.t. ti=(b
H
i Σdbi + 1)
−1, i = 1, 2, ..., N.
(40)
Next, we show that the approximated problem (40) can be
reformulated as a convex semi-definite program (SDP). Omit-
ting all the constant terms, problem (40) can be equivalently
formulated as
min
Σd0,{ti}Ni=1
N∑
i=1
|Gi|2pi
[
mmse( |Gi|
2pi
bH
i
Σ¯dbi+1
)
]
ti + λtr(Σd)
s.t. ti = (b
H
i Σdbi + 1)
−1, i = 1, 2, ..., N.
(41)
As MMSE is nonnegative [43], problem (41) is equivalent to
the following problem:
min
Σd0,{ti}Ni=1
N∑
i=1
|Gi|2pi
[
mmse( |Gi|
2pi
bH
i
Σ¯dbi+1
)
]
ti + λtr(Σd)
s.t. ti ≥ (bHi Σdbi + 1)−1, i = 1, 2, ..., N. (42)
Finally, by applying Shur complement [37], problem (42) can
be recast as
min
Σd0,{ti}Ni=1
N∑
i=1
|Gi|2pi
[
mmse( |Gi|
2pi
bH
i
Σ¯dbi+1
)
]
ti + λtr(Σd)
s.t.
[
bHi Σdbi + 1 1
1 ti
]
 0, i = 1, 2, ..., N.
(43)
Problem (43) is a standard SDP, which can be solved by
convex solvers such as CVX [44] or SeDuMi [45].
We now show the convergence of the proposed successive
convex approximation algorithm. The first-order convex ap-
proximation of the function Ti(ti), i.e., T˜i(ti) in (39), satisfies
the following three relations:
• T˜i(ti) ≥ Ti(ti), ∀ti, since Ti(ti) is concave with respec-
tive to ti [43];
• T˜i(t¯i) = Ti(t¯i);
• T˜ ′i (t¯i) = T
′
i (t¯i).
Hence, according to [46], the proposed successive convex ap-
proximation algorithm will converge to a point satisfying KKT
conditions of the original problem (36), thereby leading to a
stationary local maximum of problem (36). This successive
convex approximation method for solving problem (36), called
SCA algorithm, is summarized in Table II, and the artificial
noise aided power allocation algorithm, called Algorithm 2,
for solving (31) is summarized in Table III.
TABLE III
Algorithm 2: Proposed artificial noise aided power allocation scheme
for discrete inputs.
Given: λh ≥ λl = 0, {pi}Ni=1
repeat:
step 1: update λ = 1
2
(λl + λh)
step 2: repeat:
obtain the optimal Σd using SCA Algorithm in Table II
and then obtain {pi}Ni=1 by solving (35)
until: L(p,Σd, λ) meets a specified convergence criterion
step 3: if 1
N
(
tr(Σd) +
N∑
i=1
pi
)
< P , then update λh = λ,
else update λl = λ
until: λ meets a specified convergence criterion.
TABLE IV
Algorithm 3: Proposed artificial noise aided power allocation scheme
for Gaussian inputs.
Given: λh ≥ λl = 0, {pi}Ni=1
repeat:
step 1: update λ = 1
2
(λl + λh)
step 2: repeat:
by solving problem (45) using CVX
and then obtain {pi}Ni=1 by (44)
until: L(p,Σd, λ) meets a specified convergence criterion
step 3: if 1
N
(
tr(Σd) +
N∑
i=1
pi
)
< P , then update λh = λ,
else update λl = λ
until: λ meets a specified convergence criterion.
D. Gaussian Channel Inputs
The proposed artificial noise aided power allocation
algorithm can be significantly simplified when all si are
Gaussian. In this case, the optimal solution p⋆i in (35) is simply
given by
p⋆i =


1
2|Hi|2|Gˆi|2
(√
Cˆ2−4|Hi|2|Gˆi|2 λ+|Gˆi|2−|Hi|2λ −Cˆ
)
,
if |Hi|2−|Gˆi|2 > λ
0, otherwise,
(44)
where Gˆi = Gi√
bH
i
Σdbi+1
and Cˆ = |Hi|2+ |Gˆi|2. Problem
(36) for this case also reduces to a simple convex optimization
problem as follows:
Σ⋆d = arg min
Σd0
N∑
i=1
log2
(
1 +
|Gi|2pi
bHi Σdbi + 1
)
+ λtr(Σd).
(45)
The resulting algorithm, Algorithm 3, for Gaussian inputs is
given in Table IV.
E. Numerical Results
We now show some numerical results to compare the
performance of the proposed artificial noise aided power
allocation algorithms (Algorithm 2 in Table III for discrete
inputs and Algorithm 3 in Table III for Gaussian inputs)
with the power allocation algorithm without using artificial
noise (Algorithm 1 in Table I) and the classical/mercury
water-filling strategy with no eavesdropper (Eve) [47]. The
OFDM system with N = 64 subcarriers and CP length
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Fig. 7: Secrecy rates achieved by Algorithm 2 in Table III
using artificial noise (AN) for discrete inputs (denoted by “⊲”),
Algorithm 3 in Table IV using artificial noise for Gaussian
inputs (also denoted by “⊲”), Algorithm 1 in Table I without
using artificial noise (denoted by “×”), and transmission rate
with no eavesdropper achieved by classical/mercury water-
filling strategy (denoted by “◦”).
Ncp = 16 samples is considered. The channel coefficients
{Hi} and {Gi} are generated by following the same procedure
in Section III-B. The numerical results are averaged over
300 channel realizations with different values of SNR = P
(where artificial noise power is included in the total transmit
power P ). Figure 7 shows the secrecy rate performance of
the three transmission schemes. One can observe from this
figure that Algorithm 2 and Algorithm 3 (denoted by “ ⊲”)
using artificial noise outperform Algorithm 1 (denoted by
“×”) without using artificial noise for all SNR values, and
the amount of performance improvement is larger for higher
SNR, justifying the effectiveness of the artificial noise design.
The performance of the scheme with no eavesdropper (denoted
by “◦”) is expectantly better than either of Algorithm 2 and
Algorithm 3 using artificial noise. However, the amount of
performance difference for both finite constellations of QPSK
and 16QAM is smaller for higher SNR, while it tends to
saturate for higher SNR for the case of Gaussian inputs. These
numerical results have substantiated the efficacy of Algorithm
2 and Algorithm 3 using artificial noise.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We have presented three efficient transmission schemes for
OFDM wiretap channels. The use of time-domain artificial
noise was also considered for jamming the eavesdropper.
These schemes were designed by maximizing secrecy rate
under the constraint of total transmit power, and the Lagrange
dual optimization method was used to resolve the associated
nonconvex optimization problems. The proposed schemes con-
sist of Algorithm 1 without using artificial noise for discrete
inputs, Algorithm 2 using artificial noise for discrete inputs,
and Algorithm 3 using artificial noise for Gaussian inputs. The
duality gap for Algorithm 1 was shown to decrease with N
(the number of subcarriers of OFDM) in the order O(1/
√
N ).
Numerical results were also provided to demonstrate that
Algorithm 1 significantly outperforms some existing schemes
though artificial noise is not used, and that Algorithm 2 (for
discrete inputs) and Algorithm 3 (for Gaussian inputs) can
further upgrade the secrecy rate performance compared to
Algorithm 1 due to the use of the time-domain artificial noise.
As a future research, it is of interest to consider the
scenario where the CSI of the eavesdropper is unknown or
partially known to the transmitter [48]. Moreover, the scenario
that instead of throwing away the cyclic prefix in standard
OFDM systems, the eavesdropper can employ a more effective
receiver, is worthy of further investigation. In our work, the
artificial noise is only placed in the null space of the legitimate
receiver’s channel. The artificial noise design by placing the
artificial noise in a suitable subspace depending on both the
legitimate receiver’s and the eavesdropper’s channels is also
left as a future study.
APPENDIX I: PROOF OF (21)
In view of the fact that {si} are i.i.d., and {wi} and {vi}
are also identically distributed, let us write the secrecy rate on
the frequency f as
Rs(f, p) , [I(s;H(f)√ps+n)−I(s;G(f)√ps+n)]+, (46)
where s has the same distribution as si and n has the same
distribution as wi or vi. According to Proposition 1, we only
need to consider the the frequencies with H(f) > G(f).
Since H(f) and G(f) are Lipschitz continuous, they are
also uniformly bounded, such that
|H(f)| ≤MH , |G(f)| ≤MG, ∀f ∈ [0, 1] (47)
where MH > 0 and MG > 0 are constants. By (9), (10), (47)
and mmse(|H(f)|2p) ≤ E[|s|2] = 1 [34], we have that
∂Rs(f, p)
∂p
(48a)
=|H(f)|2mmse(|H(f)|2p)−|G(f)|2mmse(|G(f)|2p) (48b)
≤|H(f)|2 ≤M2H . (48c)
According to the Lagrange’s mean value theorem [35], (48)
implies that
|Rs(f, p)−Rs(f, p′)| ≤M2H |p− p′|, (49)
for any two p, p′ ≥ 0. On the other hand, using (19), (47),
mmse(|H(f)|2p) ≤ 1, and
∂I(s;H√ps+n)
∂|H |2p = 2p|H |mmse(|H |
2
p), (50)
we can attain an upper bound of |Rs(f, p)−Rs(f ′, p)|, i.e.,
|Rs(f, p)−Rs(f ′, p)|
≤ |I(s;H(f)√ps+ n) − I(s;H(f ′)√ps+ n)|
+ |I(s;G(f)√ps+ n)− I(s;G(f ′)√ps+ n)|
≤ 2pMH
∣∣H(f)−H(f ′)∣∣+ 2pMG∣∣G(f)−G(f ′)∣∣
≤ (2pMHLH + 2pMGLG) |f − f ′|. (51)
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By (49) and (51), we obtain that
|Rs(f, p)−Rs(f ′, p′)|
=|Rs(f, p)−Rs(f, p′) +Rs(f, p′)−Rs(f ′, p′)|
≤|Rs(f, p)−Rs(f, p′)|+ |Rs(f, p′)−Rs(f ′, p′)|
≤M2H |p− p′|+ (2pMHLH + 2pMGLG)|f − f ′|
≤max{M2H , 2pMHLH + 2pMGLG}
(
|p− p′|+ |f − f ′|
)
,
(52)
which is the same as (21) in which
LR = max{M2H , 2pMHLH + 2pMGLG}.
APPENDIX II: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
The objective function of problem (24) can be rewritten as
follows:
RANs =
1
N
N∑
i=1
[I(si; Hi√pi√
|Hi|2σ2a,i + 1
si+w˜i
)
− I(si; Gi√pi√
|Gi|2σ2a,i + 1
si+v˜i
)]+ (53)
where w˜i = (Hiaˆi + wi)/
√
|Hi|2σ2a,i + 1 and v˜i = (Giaˆi +
vi)/
√
|Gi|2σ2a,i + 1 are Gaussian with zero mean and unity
variance. The Lagrangian of problem (24) is given by
RANs +λ
(
P − 1
N
N∑
i=1
pi − 1
N
N∑
i=1
σ2a,i
)
+
N∑
i=1
µiσ
2
a,i+
N∑
i=1
ηipi ,
where λ ≥ 0 and {µi ≥ 0, ηi ≥ 0} are the Lagrange
dual variables associated with the constraints (24b) and (24c),
respectively. Then the optimal solutions of problem (24),
denoted by {p⋆i } and {σ2⋆a }, must satisfy the following KKT
necessary conditions [42]:
∂RANs
∂p⋆i
− 1
N
λ+ ηi = 0, i = 1, 2, ..., N, (54a)
∂RANs
∂σ2⋆a,i
− 1
N
λ+ µi = 0, i = 1, 2, ..., N, (54b)
λ
(
P − 1
N
N∑
i=1
p⋆i −
1
N
N∑
i=1
σ2⋆a,i
)
= 0, (54c)
µiσ
2⋆
a,i = 0, ηip
⋆
i = 0, i = 1, 2, ..., N, (54d)
λ ≥ 0, µi ≥ 0, ηi ≥ 0, i=1, 2, ..., N, (54e)
σ2⋆a,i ≥ 0, p⋆i ≥ 0. (54f)
If |Hi| ≤ |Gi| for some i, then |Hi|
2pi
|Hi|2σ2a,i+1
≤ |Gi|2pi|Gi|2σ2a,i+1 ,
and thus
I

si; Hi√pi√
|Hi|2σ2a,i + 1
si+w˜i

−I

si; Gi√pi√
|Gi|2σ2a,i + 1
si+v˜i




+
=0
(55)
regardless of the values of p⋆i and σ2⋆a,i. Therefore, we can
assume that |Hi| > |Gi| > 0 for all i = 1, . . . , N , without
loss of generality3.
3As |Gi| = 0 means no eavesdropper, there is no need to use artificial
noise, i.e., σ2⋆a,i = 0.
We use contradiction to prove the result. Suppose that
σ2⋆a,i > 0 (56)
for some i. Then it is necessary that p⋆i > 0; otherwise we
end up with (55) again, and thus σ2⋆a,i = 0 is also a feasible
solution. With σ2⋆a,i > 0 and p⋆i > 0, we have µi = 0 and
ηi = 0 by (54d). By (54a), (54b) and (54e), we further obtain
∂RANs
∂p⋆i
=
∂RANs
∂σ2⋆a,i
=
1
N
λ ≥ 0. (57)
By [49, Equation (22)] and by using the chain rule, one can
show that
∂RANs
∂p⋆i
=
1
N
[
|Hi|2Eb,i(p⋆i , σ2⋆a,i)
|Hi|2σ2⋆a,i + 1
− |Gi|
2Ee,i(p⋆i , σ2⋆a,i)
|Gi|2σ2⋆a,i + 1
]
≥0,
(58)
∂RANs
∂σ2⋆a,i
=
1
N
[
|Gi|4p⋆i Ee,i(p⋆i , σ2⋆a,i)
(|Gi|2σ2⋆a,i + 1)2
− |Hi|
4p⋆i Eb,i(p⋆i ,σ2⋆a,i)
(|Hi|2σ2⋆a,i+1)2
]
≥0,
(59)
where Eb,i(p⋆i , σ2⋆a,i) and Ee,i(p⋆i , σ2⋆a,i), similar to (10), are
given by
Eb,i(p⋆i , σ2⋆a,i)=E
[∣∣si−E[si|Hi√p⋆i si +Hiaˆi + wi]∣∣2]≥0,
Ee,i(p⋆i , σ2⋆a,i)=E
[∣∣si−E[si|Gi√p⋆i si +Giaˆi + vi]∣∣2]≥ 0.
Combining |Hi|
2p⋆i
|Hi|2σ2⋆a,i+1
>
|Gi|2p⋆i
|Gi|2σ2⋆a,i+1
> 0 (due to |Hi| >
|Gi|) and (58) yields
|Hi|2p⋆i
(|Hi|2σ2⋆a,i + 1)
|Hi|2
(|Hi|2σ2⋆a,i + 1)
Eb,i(p⋆i , σ2⋆a,i)
>
|Gi|2p⋆i
(|Gi|2σ2⋆a,i + 1)
|Gi|2
(|Gi|2σ2⋆a,i + 1)
Ee,i(p⋆i , σ2⋆a,i), (60)
which, however, contradicts with (59). Therefore, (56) is not
true and σ2⋆a,i = 0 for all i. By this, the asserted statement is
proved.
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